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Abstract  
 
China has experienced an unprecedented fertility decline since the early 
1970s. Available data show that the total fertility rate has fallen from 
about 6 children per woman to approximately 1.5 children in the past 
four  decades.  This  change  has  not  only  greatly  altered  China’s 
demographic map, but also incited considerable discussion on the quality 
of  China’s  recent  fertility  data  and  the  impact  of  China’s  traditional 
culture on people’s fertility behaviour in the past and present. This paper 
further  examines  China’s  recent  fertility  changes  with  a  particular 
attention being directed to the following questions: China’s below and 
far below replacement fertility since the early 1990s; the reliability of 
China’s  recent fertility data; and some historical and cultural  factors 
that contribute to China’s rapid fertility decline. 
 
Key Words: Fertility decline, China, data and methods of fertility 
analysis 
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Résumé 
 
Depuis le début des années 1970, la Chine subit un déclin de fécondité 
sans  précédent.  Les  données  disponibles  démontrent  qu’au  cours  des 
dernières quatre décades, l’indice synthétique de fécondité a chuté d’à 
peu près six enfants par femme à environ 1.5 enfants. Ce changement a 
non seulement grandement altéré la carte démographique du la Chine, 
mais a aussi suscité beaucoup de discussion au sujet de la qualité des 
données  récentes  en  matière  de  fécondité  en  Chine  et  l'impact  de  la 
culture traditionnelle chinoise sur les comportements de fécondité passés 
et présents. Cet article continu à examiner les changements récents en 
matière de fécondité en Chine tout en portant une attention particulière 
aux questions suivantes: Le taux de fécondité sous ou très en dessous le 
seuil de remplacement depuis le début des années 1990, la fiabilité des 
données récentes en matière de fécondité en Chine, et quelques facteurs 
historiques  et  culturels  qui  contribue  au  déclin  rapide  du  taux  de 
fécondité en Chine. 
 
Mots-clés: Déclin du taux de fécondité, Chine, données en matière de 
fécondité 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
China has experienced an unprecedented fertility decline since the early 
1970s, with its total fertility rate (TFR) falling from about 6 children per 
woman to approximately 1.5 children in the past four decades. This paper 
further  examines  China’s  recent  fertility  changes.  It  starts  with  the 
discussion of China’s below and far below replacement fertility since the 
early 1990s, which is followed by the investigation into the reliability of 
China’s  recent  fertility  data.  Then  the  paper  considers  a  number  of 
historical and cultural factors  that contribute to  China’s rapid fertility 
decline, and it ends with some concluding remarks. 
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China’s Below and Far Below Replacement Fertility 
since the Early 1990s 
 
There is a general consensus about China’s early fertility decline, which 
can  be  summarized  as  the  following.  Although  noticeable  fertility 
changes were already observed in some cities in the 1950s and 1960s, 
China’s  national  fertility  level  remained  high  in  most  years  of  these 
decades (Lavely and Freedman 1990). Facing the fast population growth, 
Chinese government launched a radical family planning campaign in the 
early  1970s,  which  played  a  significant  part  in  China’s great fertility 
reduction.  By 1980,  the TFR had  already fallen  to  around 2.5,  and it 
fluctuated in the decade that followed, varying between 2.3 and 2.9 (Yao 
1995).  These  fluctuations  were  largely  observed  in  period  fertility 
however, and cohort fertility showed a general decline in the decade. By 
1990, China’s TFR was already close to replacement level. While these 
recorded  fertility  statistics  have  been  influenced  slightly  by  under-
registration of births, they could represent China's fertility trends over the 
period from 1950 to 1990. 
Since the early 1990s, the consensus about China’s fertility similar 
to  that  existing  in  previous  two  decades  has  largely  disappeared. 
Although recorded fertility statistics suggest a marked fall in fertility in 
1991 and 1992, and a further reduction thereafter, remarkably different 
opinions on China’s fertility levels and the quality of its recent fertility 
data have widely existed. This section examines China’s recent fertility 
trends on the basis of recorded fertility, the reliability of fertility levels 
reported by 2006 fertility survey and the tempo effect on China’s recent 
TFRs. 
 
 
Observed Fertility Trends 
 
China’s 1990 population census recorded that the TFR reached 2.3 that 
year (Yao 1995). After two years, the 1992 fertility survey by the State 
Family  Planning  Commission  reported  a  further  fertility  reduction. 
According to the survey, TFRs were 2.05, 1.64, and 1.57 in 1990, 1991 
and 1992, respectively (Hao and Gao 1996). These results were rejected 
immediately because of a widely held belief that the survey was affected 
by  severe  under-registration  (Zeng  1996).  In  1995,  the  Chinese 
government  conducted  a  nationwide  one-percent  population  sample 
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survey, also known as 1995 mini-census. This survey reported an even 
lower fertility for the year, only 1.43. This was too widely seen as the 
result of under-reporting. Since then, one national census was conducted 
in 2000, another one-percent population sample survey was conducted in 
2005, and three national fertility surveys were conducted in 1997, 2001 
and 2006. In addition, the annual population change survey conducted by 
the National Bureau of Statistics each year also collected and reported 
fertility  data.  Although  many  researchers  had  hoped  that  these  later 
undertakings could overcome the suspected under-registration problem 
and report higher fertility, all of them recorded consistently low or lower 
fertility except that the 2006 fertility survey recorded high fertility in the 
two  or  three  years  before  the  time  of enumeration. These results  are 
presented  in  Figure  1,  from  which  the  following  observations  can  be 
made. 
According  to  most  of  the  censuses,  population  sample  survey, 
fertility surveys and annual population change surveys, China’s TFR was 
within  the  range o f  2. 2  a n d  2 . 4  i n  t he  y ea r  1 9 9 0 ,  al t h o ug h  t h e  1 9 9 2  
fertility survey reported a slightly lower TFR which was 2.05. A marked 
fertility reduction took place in the next two to three years. By 1991, the 
recorded  TFR  was  around  1.8,  and  this  was  likely  the  first  time  that 
China’s  national  fertility  fell  to  below  replacement.  By  1992,  the 
recorded TFRs were between 1.5 and 1.7. In the next 15 years, China’s 
recorded TFRs declined further, although there were some fluctuations. 
For most of the years, observed TFRs centered around 1.4, which was 
fairly close to the level of policy fertility of 1.47, estimated on the basis 
of government fertility regulations across China (Gu, Wang, Guo and 
Zhang  2007).  Given  the  fact  that  these  data  were  obtained  through 
different undertakings and the sample size of some surveys is relatively 
small, these results are rather consistent. Since 1993, all recorded TFRs 
have been lower than 1.6 except those for 2005 and 2006, which were 
reported by the 2006 fertility survey. The high fertility for the two years 
was closely related to some sampling problems that were observed in the 
survey. After this has been taken into account, the adjusted fertility rates 
for these years are notably lower, and this will be detailed in the next 
sub-section. Accordingly, all collected data suggest that China’s fertility 
has  been  far  below  replacement  for  more  than  a  decade.  China  has 
become one of the countries with very low fertility in the world. 
China’s recent fertility changes can be further examined by parity. 
The TFR can be computed by parity which is denoted by TFR1, TFR2 
and TFR3+ in the following discussion. Similarly, we can calculate Mean 
Age  at  Childbearing  (MAC)  for  women  by  parity  that  is  denoted  by 
MAC1, MAC2 and MAC3+. Here the parity is indicated by the subscript 1, 
2 and 3+. These  statistics are computed for years from 1994 to 2007 
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using data collected by China’s recent annual population change surveys, 
censuses, and one-percent population sample surveys. The same could 
not be done for 1991, 1992 and 1993, because of the restriction of data 
availability.
1 These results, presented in Table 1, shed further lights on 
fertility patterns in recent years. 
According to Table 1, TFRs were relatively low in 1995, 2000 and 
2005 when the results were computed using data collected by population 
censuses or one-percent population sample surveys rather than  annual 
population change surveys. The low TFRs observed in 2000 and 2005 
were largely a result of the relatively low TFR1 recorded in the same 
years.  While the TFR1 was also relatively low  in 1995 in comparison 
with  those  in  consecutive  years,  its  impact  on  the  TFR  was 
comparatively small. 
In  7  out  of  the  11  years  when  listed  fertility  statistics  were 
computed using data collected by annual population change surveys, the 
recorded TFR1 was greater than 1.0, while in other 4 years it was very 
close to that value. Under normal conditions when there is no heaping in 
first birth, the TFR1 is expected to be lower than 1.0 because there are 
always some women who do not marry or do not have any children. A 
TFR1 with a value of 1.0 or greater is an indication of a concentration of 
first births. This could happen under the following circumstances: some 
women start lowering their childbearing ages or stopped postponing their 
childbearing  ages.  Both  of  them  alter  existing  fertility  schedules  and 
cause fertility heaping. Of  course, heaping in reported first births can 
also occur when collected data were biased by problems in sampling or 
reporting as will be shown later. 
One  way  of  investigating  the  cause  of  fertility  heaping  is  to 
examine  changes  in  mean  age  at  birth.  Table  1  also  presents  parity-
specific MAC for years from 1994 to 2007, which are computed using 
the  method  proposed  by  Bongaarts  and  Feeney  (1998).  These  results 
show that the MAC computed from data collected by the census or one-
percent population sample surveys tends to be lower than that obtained 
from  annual  population  change  surveys.  The  relatively  low  TFR1 
corresponded to the relatively low  MAC1 in 1995, 2000 and to some 
extent 2005. This seems to have suggested that the relatively low TFRs 
for these years were not a result of women postponing their childbearing. 
In other years when they were calculated using data gathered by annual 
population change surveys, both TFR1 and MAC1 tended to be higher. It 
is particularly noteworthy that the heaping in TFR1 corresponded to the 
increasing MAC1 in years 1996 to 1999, and 2001. 
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        Survey (PSS).  2) Annual population change survey data are not available for 1991, 1992 and 1993. 
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        Source: 1) NBS (1990-2007); 2) Guo (2000); 3) Ding (2003); 4) Guo (2004); 5) Guo (forthcoming); 
        and 6) Guo (unpublished paper).
Figure 1 Changes in TFRs in China 1990-2006
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These  contradicting  results  may  be  explained  by  the  following 
reasons. First, it may be related to misreporting. As suggested by Zhang 
(2004) that many women  could not have  a second child  according to 
China’s family planning regulations. Some of them, after having had the 
second child, might have misreported the birth as the first one. This was 
more likely to have taken place in the annual population change survey, 
because the survey is more concerned with the number of children born 
in the year before the enumeration. In contrast, in the census and one-
percent  population  sample  survey,  which  recorded  all  children  in  the 
family, misreporting second birth as first one was less likely to happen. 
Second, the heaping in TFR1 could have resulted from biases in sample 
selection,  under-recording  the  floating  population  for  example. 
  While  data  restriction  preventing  us  from  an  in-depth 
investigation  into  such  a  possibility  in  the  annul  population  change 
survey, sample selection biases have been found in other operations such 
as the 2006 fertility survey, which will be discussed in the following sub-
section. The relatively low TFR or TFR1 in the census and one-percent 
population sample survey data may also arise from the fact that these 
data tend to be affected more by under-registration of birth than those 
collected by the annual population survey. 
 
 
The 2006 Fertility Survey Results 
 
As noted  in  the previous sub-section, all recent  censuses, one-percent 
population  sample  surveys,  national  fertility  surveys a n d  a n n u a l  
population  change  surveys  found  consistently  low  fertility  except  that 
2006 national population and family planning survey recorded a much 
higher fertility in the two or three years before the time of enumeration. 
According  to  the  survey  report p u b l i s h e d  b y  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ,  ‘ a  l o w  
fertility has been stably maintained, but it has shown an increase in recent 
years. TFRs for Chinese women were 1.59, 1.74 and 1.87 for 2004, 2005 
and the year before the survey (September 2005 to August 2006). For the 
three years, total first marriage rates were 1.23, 1.16 and 1.11, and total 
fertility  rates  for  parity  one  were  1.07,  1.23,  and  1.32,  respectively, 
indicating some heaping in first marriage and first birth’ (NPFPC 2007). 
Examining  fertility  patterns  recorded  by  the  2006  fertility  survey  and 
identifying  their  underlying  reasons  are  crucial  for  resolving  the 
controversy  caused  by  these  results  and  for  understanding  China’s 
current fertility situation. 
The comparison of fertility patterns reported by the 2006 fertility 
survey with those observed from other fertility data shows a consistent 
fertility  trend  for  years  from  1995  to  2003,  as  indicated  by  Figure  1 
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presented earlier. So far as the completeness of registering births born in 
these years  is  concerned, the 2006 fertility survey  is rather similar to 
other demographic surveys.  
The 2006 fertility survey recorded markedly high fertility for 2004, 
2005 and 2006, which was to a large extent caused by the heaping in first 
birth, as implied by the officially released survey report. If there were no 
heaping  in  childbearing,  the  TFR1 s h o u l d  b e  l es s  t h a n  o r e q u a l t o  1 . 
Assuming that the TFR1 were 1 rather than the observed values for 2004, 
2005 and 2006, the TFRs would reduce to 1.52, 1.51 and 1.55 for these 
years, respectively. If the influence of other factors that contributed to 
the relatively high fertility were also removed, the fertility level could be 
lower. 
If it indeed existed, the heaping in first birth and first marriage as 
mentioned  above  would  be  found  by o t h e r  d e m o g r a p h i c  s u r v e y s .  
However, when fertility patterns reported by the 2006 fertility survey are 
compared with those recorded by 2005 one-percent population sample 
survey,  the  following  discrepancy  emerges.  For  year  2005,  the  TFR 
reported by the 2006 fertility survey was 1.74, but according to the one-
percent population sample survey, it was only 1.33. The latter, which is 
significantly lower than that recorded by the 2006 survey, shows no sign 
of being affected by heaping in first birth. Similarly, the TFR registered 
by the annual population change survey for 2006 was only 1.38, much 
lower than the 1.87 reported by the fertility survey carried out that year. 
The inconsistency of this magnitude calls for a further investigation into 
the cause of the heaping in first marriage and first birth shown in the 
2006 fertility survey data. 
The comparison of the population sampled by the 2006 fertility 
survey with those enumerated by the 2005 one-percent population sample 
survey and  the 2006 annual population  change  survey reveals notable 
differences  in  their  composition.  In  comparison  with  the  other  two 
surveys, the 2006 fertility survey seems to have under-sampled young 
(aged 15-24) and never married women, and over-sampled women who 
live in rural areas and have low or no education, as shown in Table 2. 
Because most young and single women would not start their childbearing 
and women living in rural areas and with low or no education tended to 
have children at younger ages and with higher fertility, it is not a surprise 
that ‘heaping’ in first marriage and first birth has been observed in the 
population  enumerated  by  the  2006  fertility  survey.  We  have  also 
examined  the  female  population  sampled  by  2007  population  change 
survey. Its age structure and proportion of married in each age group are 
largely  consistent  with  those  sampled  by  the  2006  population  change 
survey and the 2005 population sample survey, and differ considerably 
from those enumerated by the 2006 fertility survey.   
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2006 Fertility 
Survey
2006 Annual 
Survey
2005 Mini-census
Age Distribution
15-19 7.47 15.06 14.81
20-24 9.89 11.82 11.45
25-29 12.36 11.63 12.18
30-34 17.88 14.47 15.67
35-39 20.91 17.61 17.87
40-44 19.16 17.79 15.84
45-49 12.32 11.63 12.19
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00
Proportion Never Marrying
15-19 97.17 97.77 98.65
20-24 42.05 59.17 57.36
25-29 7.31 14.08 12.71
30-34 1.06 2.49 2.13
35-39 0.27 0.77 0.65
40-44 0.22 0.35 0.35
45-49 0.11 0.26 0.25
Total 12.31 23.95 23.25
Educational Level 
    Illiteracy 7.69 3.91 5.22
    Primary 26.02 23.26 24.05
    Junior middle 41.57 48.02 47.37
    Senior middle 16.14 16.63 16.15
    College or higher 8.57 8.17 7.21
    Total 100.00 100.00 100.00
Regional Distribution
              Urban 34.31 49.79 48.43
              Rural 65.69 53.21 51.57
              Total 100.00 100.00 100.00
Sources: NPFPC 2008, NBS 2007a and NBS 2007b.
Table 2
Women of Reproductive Ages 
Sampled by 2006 Fertility Survey, 2006 Annual Population Change 
Survey and 2005 One-percent Population Sample Survey, China
_______________________________________________ _______________________________________________ _______________________________________________
_______________________________________________ _______________________________________________ _______________________________________________
Zhongwei Zhao and Zhigang Guo
CSP 2010, 37.3-4:  525-562 534 
The following example illustrates the magnitude of the influence 
arising from under-sampling never married women. Since the proportion 
of married women in each five year age group has been provided by the 
2005 one-percent population sample survey, the information can be used 
to standardize the proportion of married women in the same age group in 
the  population  recorded  by  the  2006  fertility  survey.  This  adjustment 
adds a  large number of never married women in some  age groups as 
shown in Table 3, which lowers age-specific fertility rates and TFRs.
2 As 
a result, the TFR1 computed for 2005 falls from 1.23 to 0.86 and the TFR 
decreases from 1.74 to 1.31. This standardization alone has removed the 
heaping in first birth and made the TFR very close to that reported by the 
2005 one-percent population sample survey, which is 1.33. 
The  above  analysis  suggests  that  the  relative  high  fertility 
observed in the 2006 fertility survey data is very likely a result that arises 
from the problems in sample selection. After these problems have been 
corrected, what the survey results show is not an increase in fertility in 
recent  years,  but  a  low  fertility  that  is  largely  consistent  with  that 
recorded by other surveys. 
 
 
Low Fertility and Tempo Effect 
 
China’s observed TFRs were considerably lower than the replacement 
fertility and MACs increased in general over the period between 1994 
and 2007. This  suggests  that the TFR, an indicator of period fertility 
reflecting both quantum and tempo effects, may not accurately represent 
actual changes in lifetime fertility. To disentangle these effects, this sub-
section examines the tempo-adjusted TFR, which is denoted by TFR1, for 
the study period. 
Using  the  method p r o p o s e d  b y  B o n g a a r t s  a n d  F e e n e y  ( 1 9 9 8 ) ,  
Bongaarts (2001, 2002) and the data collected by 1997 and 2001 fertility 
surveys, one of the authors found in a previous study that low TFRs in 
the 1990s were affected significantly by the tempo effect, which made 
period fertility lower than lifetime fertility (measured by TFR1 as a proxy 
of completed fertility) by an average of 0.11 in years 1990 to 1995, and 
0.23 in years 1996 to 1999 (Guo 2008). The magnitude of the influence 
is smaller than that observed in EU countries in recent years, which is 0.3 
(Lutz et al. 2003). 
This study uses census, one-percent population sample survey and 
annual population change survey data to calculate the TFR1. As shown 
earlier,  there  are  some  noticeable  differences  in  TFRn a n d  M A C n 
computed from these data sources. According to Bongaarts and Feeney 
(1998),  tempo-adjusted method  is  sensitive to variations in the MAC or 
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 MACn, which is also noted by Zeng and Land (2001). Because of that, 
notable fluctuations in MAC or MACn shown in our results could lead to 
a less reliable TFR1, if the statistics calculated for every single year were 
used in the estimation. One way to avoid such influence is to compute 
TFRs for a period of five years as suggested by Bongaarts and Feeney 
(1998). In this study, we have applied a similar approach and used the 
whole  study  period  for  tempo  adjustment.  The  procedures  are 
summarized as follow.  
First, the arithmetic mean of TFR and of each TFRn are computed 
for the period 1994-2007; Second, on the base of the total change in each 
MACn over the study period, the average annual change is calculated, 
which is the r n suggested by Bongaarts and Feeney (1998); Third, the 
average tempo-adjusted TFR1 is computed using 
' TFRn = TFR÷(1-rn); 
and Finally, the tempo effects for the study period are estimated on the 
basis of discrepancies between the average TFRn and average 
' TFRn , 
which can also be used to calculate the composition of tempo effects by 
parity. This method requires fertility statistics for start and end years of 
the study period.
3 
Table  4 p r o v i d e s  t h r e e  s e t s  of m e a n  T F R ,  T F R n,  MACn a n d  
estimated rn, the average annual increase rate of MACn. The first set of 
results are computed from the data collected by 2000 census and 1995 
and 2005 one-percent population sample surveys, which show relatively 
low TFR, TFRn and MACn in comparison with others in the table. The 
second set of results is calculated using all data collected from 1994 and 
2007, with higher TFR, TFRn and MACn. There is a notable gap between 
these two sets of estimated r1, the average annual change rate in average 
MAC1. The third set of results is computed in the same way as in the 
second, except that it uses 2006 rather than 2007 as the end year. This 
difference results in little change in average TFR, TFRn and MACn, but a 
notable change in r1, making its level closer to the first set of results. This, 
which  is  closely  related  to  the  marked  increase  in  MAC1 i n  2 0 0 7 ,  
indicates that the estimated tempo effect is sensitive to the selection of 
start or end year. Further examining whether increasing MAC1 indeed 
took place in 2007 will help to consolidate our conclusions, but this has 
to be conducted in the future when the required data become available. 
The average TFR1 and 
' TFRn  are calculated using  the formula 
described above and the statistics in Table 4. These results, together with 
Δ – the difference between the average TFR and average TFR1, and its 
decomposition by parity which is denoted as Δn, are shown in Table 5. 
According to the first set of results, which were obtained from only data 
collected  by  censuses  and  one-percent  population sample surveys, the  
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537Period TFR TFR1 TFR2  TFR3+  MAC1 
Census Data
1995-2005 1.329 0.906 0.343 0.08 23.82
All Data
1994-2007  1.423 0.987 0.359 0.078 24.57
1994-2006  1.421 0.986 0.355 0.081 24.45
Period MAC2  MAC3+ r1 r2  r3+ 
Census Data
1995-2005 28.21 30.77 0.08 0.24 0.13
All Data
1994-2007  28.93 30.94 0.15 0.25 0.11
1994-2006  28.80 30.83 0.09 0.23 0.07
Average TFRs, MACs and r Values by Parity, China 
Table 4 
Sources: See Figure 1.
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average 
 
TFR1, 
 
TFR2 and 
 
TFR3+ for  the  period  1995-2005  are  0.983, 
0.451 and 0.091, respectively. The difference between the average TFR 
(1.329) and average TFR1 (1.525) is -0.196, or the average TFR is lower 
than the expected average complete fertility by 0.196 of a birth. This can 
be decomposed into tempo-effect of parity one (0.077), parity two (0.108) 
and parity three and plus (0.012). 
From  the  statistics  of  Δ a n d  Δ n,  the  percentage  distribution  of 
tempo-effects  contributed  by  different  parity  can  be  calculated.  For 
example, results obtained from  the  census and one-percent population 
sample survey data suggest that over the period 1994 to 2005, the largest 
parity-specific tempo-effect was due to women’s postponement of their 
second birth, which accounts for 54.9 percent of the total tempo-effect. 
The  contribution  made  by  postponing  first,  and  third  and  later  births 
consists of 39.2 percent and 5.9 percent respectively. These results are 
quite similar to those obtained from the 1997 and 2001 fertility surveys 
(Guo 2008).
4 
In comparison with the first set of results, the second set of results 
show a larger tempo-effect, about 0.3 of a birth, with 57 percent of it 
contributable to the tempo-effect of first birth. The size of tempo-effect 
and its distribution computed using data for years 1994-2006 are fairly 
close to those shown in the first set of results.  
Based  on  these  observations,  we  tentatively  suggest  that t h e  
tempo-effect  arising  from  postponing b i r t h s  makes  the  average  TFR 
lower than the expected average complete fertility by about 0.2 of a birth 
over recent years. A major contributing factor for this difference is the 
tempo-effect of the second birth, which accounts for some 50 percent of 
the total. 
 
 
Reliability of China’s recent Recorded 
and Adjusted Fertility Statistics 
 
The  previous  section  shows  that  China’s  recorded  fertility  fell  below 
replacement in 1991 and is now far below this level. However, in the 
early  1990s,  it  was  overwhelmingly  believed  that  the  observed  low 
fertility was a result of severe under-registration.     This view dominated 
Table 4.  Average TFRs, MACs and r values by parity the entire decade, 
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539Period TFR TFR1 TFR2  TFR3+ 
Census Data
1995-2005 1.525 0.983 0.451 0.096
All Data
1994-2007  1.72 1.156 0.476 0.088
1994-2006  1.626 1.08 0.459 0.087
Period Δ Δ1 Δ2  Δ3+ 
Census Data
1995-2005 -0.196 -0.077 -0.108 -0.012
All Data
1994-2007  -0.297 0.169 -0.117 -0.010
1994-2006  -0.205 -0.094 -0.104 -0.006
Table 5
Average Total Fertility Rates and 
Sources: See Figure 1.
Differences Comparing with Total Fertility Rates, China
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although  has  increasingly  been  challenged  from  the  beginning  of  the 
twenty-first century. Even today, different opinions on China’s fertility 
level  still  exist.  Some  researchers  (National  Strategy  on  Population 
Development  Research  Group  2007;  CPIRC  Research  Group  2003; 
Zhang and Cui 2003) claim that China’s TFR was above 2 before the 
year 2000 and has been around 1.8 since, while others suggest that the 
fertility was already close to 1.6 in the second half of the 1990s and has 
stayed at this or a lower level thereafter (Cai 2008; Retherford et al. 2005; 
Zhang 2004). 
This rather confused situation is attributable to the following facts. 
The quality of some of  China’s demographic data, those  collected by 
recent censuses or one-percent population sample surveys for example, 
has  deteriorated  in  comparison  with  those  gathered  in  the  1980s. 
Furthermore,  while  Chinese  government  has  undertaken  many 
demographic  surveys,  information  about  under-registration,  post-
enumeration quality assessment, estimation results and procedures used 
in obtaining them, and sometimes detailed survey data have not always 
been  made  available.  In  this  section,  we  first  review  recorded  under-
registration rates of some censuses and demographic surveys. Following 
that fertility estimates made by various researchers and officially reported 
fertility rates in recent years are examined. 
 
 
Observed Under-registration in China’s recent Fertility Data 
 
China has conducted three population censuses since 1982. According to 
official sources, net underreporting rates in enumerating population are 
0.04  percent  and  0.06  percent  for  the  1982  and  1990  censuses 
respectively (under-registration of birth is about 0.1 percent for the 1990 
census),  which  are  very  low  by  international  standards.  The  reported 
under-registration rate for 2000 census is 1.81 percent, but this may still 
be regarded as moderate (Coale 1984; NBS 1993a, 2002a; Sun 2001). 
Under-registration does not distribute randomly across all age groups and 
is more likely to have taken place among children aged 0 to 4. This has 
been noted in by a number of scholars who suggested that the 1982 and 
1990 censuses might have under-recorded those aged 0 to 4 years by 3 
percent and 6 percent, respectively (Zha, Zeng, and Guo 1996; Zhang 
and Cui 2003). A simple comparison with data collected by 2005 one-
percent population sample survey suggests that comparing with previous 
censuses, under-registration of children aged 0 to 4 was more serious in 
the 2000 census.
5 
Another  major  demographic  data  source  is  China’s  nationwide 
fertility  sample  survey.  Since  1990,  four  such  fertility  surveys  were 
conducted  by  the  government.  The  data  collected  by  1992  and  1997 
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surveys  were  used  by  many  demographers.  According  to  Wang,  a 
government  official  involved  in  organizing  these  fertility  surveys,  the 
1992 fertility survey under-recorded 3 percent or more births, while other 
studies suggested that the under-registration problem was more serious 
(Wang  1996;  Zeng  1996).  As  for  the  1997  fertility  survey,  the  post-
enumeration check found that under-recording of births was 6.47 percent 
(Wang 2000). The 2001 fertility survey data were also examined by some 
researchers. They reported that the error in recording births in this survey 
was  less  than  5  percent  (Wang  and  Huang  2002).  The  latest  fertility 
survey  was  conducted  in  2006  and  its  tabulated  results  have  been 
published recently. The under-registration rate of this survey has not been 
released by the authorities. But for the first time since the mid-1990s the 
China government used the unadjusted TFRs obtained directly from a 
survey of this kind as the officially endorsed TFRs (for years 2004, 2005 
and 2006). This suggests that the government was rather confident about 
the completeness of registration in the 2006 fertility survey, despite the 
bias in sample selection, which was detailed in the previous section. 
The  third  data  source  for  fertility  studies  is  China’s  annual 
population change survey, which is conducted in approximately one per 
thousand national population each year. In comparison with censuses and 
one-percent  population  sample  surveys,  these  annual  surveys  are 
conducted by more experienced enumerators in general. Hence, they are 
expected  to  have  a  better  quality.  After  the  1993  and  1994  annual 
population change surveys, post-enumeration checks were conducted. It 
was reported that these annual surveys under-recorded crude birth rates by 
6.9 percent and 6.4 percent in the two years respectively  (Jia and Sai 
1995). Similarly, after 1995 one-percent population sample survey,  the 
rate of adjustment was also discussed and released. Since then, however, 
China’s statistical authorities have changed their practices and no longer 
published under-registration rates of annual population change surveys 
and methodological details used in obtaining officially reported TFRs. 
Information on related issues is also difficult to find. For example, Hu, 
who  has  long  been  involved  in  organizing  China’s  annual  population 
change  surveys, published  a  major paper systematically reviewing  the 
annual  survey.  The  paper  briefly  mentioned  the  issue  of  under-
registration, but failed to offer any insight about it (Hu 2005). 
The  following  conclusions  can  be  drawn  from  the  above 
discussion.  Under-registration  of  births  has  indeed  existed  in  China’s 
recent censuses, one-percent population sample surveys, fertility surveys 
and annual population change surveys. There is evidence that the quality 
of recent census data has deteriorated in comparison with those collected 
two  decades  ago.  The  under-registration  rates  of  the  1993  and  1994 
annual population surveys and recent fertility surveys, either recorded by 
post-enumeration surveys or suggested by researchers who were heavily 
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involved in these operations,  are all  lower  than 7 percent.  Even after 
taking under-registration of this  magnitude  into  consideration,  China’s 
recent  TFRs  are  still  considerably  lower  than  1.8.  Finally,  under-
registration  in recent  censuses, one-percent population sample surveys 
and fertility surveys may have not distributed evenly across children of 
all ages. Severe under-registration is often found among children who 
were born closer to the time of enumeration. 
 
 
Estimated China’s Fertility Levels  
 
Because of the under-registration in China’s recent fertility data and the 
inaccessibility to detailed information about such under-registration and 
procedures used in adjusting it and calculating officially reported fertility 
rates, many scholars have used different data, assumptions and methods 
to  estimate  fertility  levels  in  the  past  15  years.  These  studies  can  be 
broadly divided into three groups. 
The first group of studies estimates China’s fertility levels based 
largely on the assumption that officially reported numbers of births and 
fertility  rates  in  the  last  two  decades  were  generally  accurate.  They 
usually  used  these  statistics  as  important  evidence  or  benchmark a n d  
compare  them  with  data  collected  by  censuses  or  fertility  surveys  of 
various  kinds.  The  major  conclusions  of  these  studies  are  as  follow. 
China’s recent censuses and fertility surveys have considerably under-
recorded actual numbers of births and fertility. For example, the 2000 
census might have under-recorded 30 to 37 millions children who were 
under age 10 at the time of enumeration. These studies suggested that 
China’s  TFRs  have  been  higher  or  around  1.8  since  the  mid-1990s. 
Because of the assumptions used, it is not a surprise that these estimation 
results are highly consistent with officially reported fertility rates (Zhang 
and  Cui  2003;  Goodkind  2004;  Yu  and  Wang  2004,  CPIRC Research 
Group 2003).
Studies  included in the  second group use different assumptions 
and approaches to estimate China’s fertility level. For example, Cai used 
the Variable-r method developed by Preston and Coale to assess fertility 
levels in the 1990s. The results showed that in the 1990s, China’s total 
fertility  ‘indeed  reached  a  level  far  below  the  replacement’ a n d  w a s  
‘lower  than  the  official  adjustment’ ( C a i  2 0 0 8).  Retherford  and  his 
collaborators  applied  own-children  method  and  birth  history 
reconstruction  method  to  China’s  1990  and  2000  census  data.  Their 
results suggested that China’s TFR was probably around 1.6 in the mid-
1990s and even lower at the end of the decade (Retherford et al. 2005). In 
his  PhD  dissertation,  Zhang  systematically  examined  the  impact  of 
under-registration problems on China’s major fertility statistics. On the 
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basis of this investigation and estimation results, it was determined that 
China’s TFR was likely to have been between 1.59 and 1.63 in the years 
1997 and 1998 (Zhang 2004). One of the most significant conclusions 
drawn from these studies is that since mid-1990s, China’s fertility level 
has been notably  lower than the officially reported fertility, and this is 
supported  by  the  studies  conducted  independently  by  other  scholars 
including the authors of this paper.  
In  addition  to  the  studies  clustered  into  the  above  two  groups, 
several studies used school enrollment data to estimate China’s recent 
fertility level, but they have reached different conclusions. Some of the 
early studies suggested that in comparison with school enrollment data, 
the  2000  census  considerably  under-recorded  children  of  young  ages, 
which was more than 30 million (Cui and Zhang 2002; Zhang and Cui 
2004;  Liang  2003).  Under-registration  of  this  magnitude  is  consistent 
with those previously estimated by the statistical authorities and offered 
support for the high fertility claim. After a reconstruction of TFRs from 
available  education  statistics  gathered  at  both  national  and  provincial 
levels, Scharping found that China’s TFR already fell to 1.60–1.65 in 
1997 (Scharping 2005). A further study was conducted by Zhai and Chen. 
They  collected  more  detailed  data  and  their  fertility  estimates  were 
higher  than  those  reported  by  Scharping  and  fairly  close  to  officially 
reported fertility rates (Zhai and Chen 2007). The relatively high fertility 
estimates published in their paper, however, are related to the fact that a 
relatively  low s c h o o l  e n r o l l m e n t  r a t e  ( 9 5  p e r c e n t )  w a s  u s e d  i n  t h e i r  
estimation. In a paper published recently, Chen has reported the latest 
results estimated on the basis of two different school enrollment levels. 
The results estimated using a school enrollment rate of 98 percent are 
very close to those suggested by Scharping (Chen 2009). Some other 
scholars, however, have questioned the suitability of using recent school 
enrollment  data  to  estimate  fertility.  They  have  shown  that  school 
enrollment data have also been affected by registration problems. Using 
them to estimate fertility changes has some limitations, which could lead 
to  an  over-estimation  of  fertility  under  China’s  recent  particular 
circumstances (Cai 2009; Chen 2009).  
 
China’s Officially reported Fertility Levels 
 
The evidence presented up to this point overwhelmingly suggests that 
China’s TFR fell to around 1.6 or lower in the second half of the 1990s. 
But it is also well known that officially adjusted or endorsed TFRs have 
been consistently higher than this level for some 15 years, which makes a 
further examination  of numbers of births and fertility rates  from various 
official data sources necessary. 
_______________________________________________ _______________________________________________ _______________________________________________
_______________________________________________ _______________________________________________ _______________________________________________
544
Zhongwei Zhao and Zhigang Guo
CSP 2010, 37.3-4:  525-562 
Numbers  of  births  and  crude  birth  rates  (CBRs)  obtained  from 
different sources are listed in Table 6. Columns 2 and 3 present numbers 
of  births  and  CBRs  calculated  directly  from  census,  one-percent 
population sample survey and annual population change survey data.
6 
The sample size of the annual survey has been approximately one per 
thousand  of  China’s  national p o p u l a t i o n  s i n c e  1 9 9 4 .  A s  e x p e c t e d ,  
numbers  of  births  recorded  by  annual  population  change  surveys 
conducted between 1996 and 1999, which  are  listed in  column 2,  are 
about 0.1 percent of those shown in column 4. The latter are numbers of 
births  in  the  national  population,  which  were  reported  by  China 
Population Information and Research Centre but not adjusted for under-
registration. Non-adjusted CBRs for the national population are listed in 
column 5. They are very close to those listed in column 3 except for 1995 
and  2000.  Figures  shown  in  columns  6  and  7  are  officially  adjusted 
numbers  of  births  and  CBRs.  The  comparison  between  figures  in 
columns 3, 5 and 7 suggests that the officially adjusted CBRs on average 
are 1.16 times of the CBRs computed directly from the annual population 
change survey listed in columns 5 and 3 in the 1990s (see the ratios in 
columns 8 and 9). For years 2001 to 2007, the differences between them 
increased, and the figures shown in column 7 (excluding that for year 
2005 which was collected by the one-percent population sample survey) 
on average are 1.19 times of those listed in column 3. In 2000 and 2005 
when censuses or one-percent population surveys were  conducted,  the 
gap between these figures was greater. For 2005, the CBR in column 7 
was 1.31 times of that in column 3. The two sets of unadjusted CBRs 
(shown in columns 3 and 5) differ notably for 2000 (also for 1995), and 
both of them were considerably lower than the officially adjusted figures 
in column 7.
7 A comparison of TFRs shows similar results. For example, 
for periods 1994-1999 and 2001-2004, the officially adjusted TFRs were 
on average 1.21 times of the unadjusted TFRs calculated directly from 
annual  population  change  survey  or  one-percent  population  sample 
survey  results.
8 I n  c o n t r a s t ,  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  o f f i c i a l l y  a d j u s t e d  
TFRs and recorded TFRs were also larger for 2000 and 2005. Because 
China’s statistical authorities have hardly made any public comment on 
the magnitude of their adjustment of CBRs and  TFRs (except for  the 
adjustment result made for 1995) and details about the procedures used in 
making  such adjustments are not available,  inconsistencies  in fertility 
rates found from various sources still confuse many people. 
The  results  presented  above  suggest  that  China’s  officially 
adjusted numbers of births, CBRs and  TFRs are markedly higher than 
those  computed  directly  from  or  indicated  by  census,  one-percent 
population sample survey and annual population change survey data. The 
difference  is  notably  greater than that indicated by the under-registration  
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rate found by some post-enumeration checks and other evidence. Without 
sufficient justification, this may be reasonably seen as an over-adjustment. 
This  has also  been pointed out by Qiao, who claimed  that  China’s 
National Bureau of Statistics ‘artificially added almost 3 million births 
each year’ to the total population over the period 1990–1999 (Qiao 2005: 
12). The statistical authorities might have their own reasons for inflating 
numbers of births, CBRs and TFRs at a level higher than that suggested 
by  the  under-registration  rates  obtained  from  some  post-enumeration 
surveys,  practices  of  this  kind  inevitably  create  confusion,  especially 
when  no  adequate  justification  was  given.
9 I n d e e d ,  t h e s e  o f f i c i a l l y  
adjusted, and  most likely over-inflated, fertility rates have contributed 
directly to the perplexity surrounding China’s recent fertility level. 
 
 
China’s Fertility Transition:  Some Lessons 
 
China’s fertility, after its unprecedented reduction in the 1970s and some 
fluctuations in the 1980s, experienced another major change in the 1990s. 
The TFR fell first to below replacement in 1991 and then to far below 
this level in the second half of the decade. Although it had been expected 
that this was largely a result of under-registration of births, all recent 
censuses  and surveys have failed  to uncover these ‘missing’ children. 
Instead, they have shown consistently that China’s fertility was very low 
from the mid-1990s and has stayed at this or a lower level since. Even 
after adjusted for tempo-effect, the implied life time fertility for Chinese 
women  has  been  below  replacement  for  nearly  two  decades.  These 
changes raise many important questions. Why in China, a country with a 
tradition that was and is still widely seen as very pro-natalist, fertility fell 
rapidly in the 1970s and is now far below replacement? What can we 
learn from China’s fertility transition? In what way have China’s cultural 
traditions  contributed  to  this  great  demographic  change?  This  section 
tries to briefly address some of these questions. 
 
 
Government Intervention:  $ Driving Force of Demographic Change 
 
In comparison with fertility decline in most developed countries, China’s 
fertility transition has two remarkable features. First, it started when the 
level of socio-economic development was low, the society was largely 
rural, the standard of living was poor, and the formal education was not 
available for a considerable part of the population. Second, the fertility 
reduction, especially in the 1970s and early 1980s, was largely driven by 
a government organized family planning program, which was never seen 
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in the west and some other parts of the world. Partly because of that, the 
role played by coercive or punitive measures sometimes have been over-
emphasized. 
It  is  worth  noting  that  government  promoted  family  planning 
programs, which began  in India  in 1951, have existed in  many Asian 
countries.  China’s  family  planning  program  has  been  a  part  of  and 
affected greatly by this general trend. While family planning programs 
have existed in both developing and developed countries and contributed 
to  their  fertility  decline,  noticeable  differences  exist  between  them. 
Family  planning  started  in  the  nineteenth  century  or  early  twentieth 
century in many western developed countries. It was largely a private and 
philanthropic  enterprise  and  primarily  for  the  purpose  of  granting 
individuals, especially women, control over their own reproduction. In 
these countries, family planning was organized and executed mostly by 
voluntary  family  planning  associations  or  other  kinds  of  none 
government  organizations.  Governments  often  left  family  planning 
education  and  services  to  the  medical  profession  and  to  retailers  and 
pharmacists,  and  they  played  no  observable  role  in  this  great  social 
demographic  change.  Many  governments  are  still  reluctant  to  give 
technical assistance in this field. This is closely related to a tradition that 
in  most  of  these  countries,  the  government  had  never  been  the 
unchallenged  arbiter  of  morals,  especially  of  sexual  and  reproductive 
morals. This was role that was claimed largely by the Christian churches. 
In  contrast,  situation  in  China,  as  well  as  in  some  other  Asian 
countries, has been different. In Chinese history, for example, there were 
no monolithic religions with firmly organized hierarchies and a tradition 
of  receiving  binding  moral  interpretations  from  a  supreme  religious 
leader. This vacuum was often filled by the emperor who was literally 
called ‘son of heaven’ and the imperial government, and by the strong 
tradition of moral leadership by secular leaders. This was especially the 
case when national issues were addressed. Thus, it is entirely logical that 
after learning that population growth was faster than had been expected, 
China  and  many  other  Asian  countries,  started  government  led  or 
promoted  family  programs.  Differing  from  their  western  counterparts, 
governments in China and some other developing countries provided not 
only family planning information and services but also added a moral 
dimension  to  family  planning  through  arguing  that  population  control 
was good for  the family and necessary for the  country.  Moreover, in 
China and some developing countries, both incentive  and disincentive 
measures were used to implement government family planning policies 
and to induce people to regulate their reproduction. While some of these 
measures have been very controversial, it is important to note that the 
leading  role  played  by  the  government  in  family  planning  is  a  major 
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factor  that  contributes  to  China’s  nationwide  rapid  fertility  reduction 
which took place when its socio-economic development engine was not 
yet powerful enough to trigger this great change. 
 
 
Extended Family, Collective Reproductive Strategies and Public 
Response to Government’s Family Planning Programs 
 
That China’s government-led family planning could have received a wide 
support from its large population, which was particular the case in the 
1970s, is also related to family systems and reproductive strategies in 
historical China. In demographic literature, the prevalence of traditional 
large extended families has often been linked to pro-natalist culture and 
high fertility. Yet, it is noteworthy that some countries that historically 
had stem or joint family systems now have  the lowest fertility  in the 
world. The influence of certain aspects of such family systems and the 
reproductive  strategies  under  such  systems  may  have  played  a  non-
negative role in recent fertility decline. 
Differing  from  many  western  countries  especially  those  in 
northwest  Europe,  where  the  nuclear  family  system  dominated  even 
before  the  industrial  revolution,  the  joint  family  system  prevailed  in 
many parts of China in the past. Under such a family system, the interest 
of the  large family,  the continuation of  the direct family line (passed 
from the father to his oldest son), early marriage and early childbearing 
ware widely promoted.  
Such  a  family  system  tended  to  surrender  the i n t e r e s t  o f  a n  
individual or a conjugal unit to the large family or even the lineage to 
which these individuals belonged. Decision-making regarding marriage 
and  reproduction  often  became  a  familial  or  community  prerogative 
rather  than  an  individual’s  choice.  Family  members  were  frequently 
taught and encouraged to make sacrifices for their families and future 
generations.  Their  marriage  and  reproduction  were  often  strongly 
influenced  by  the  interests  of  the  extended  family  or  even  decided 
entirely  by  their  seniors.  Studies  have  shown  that  in  some  Chinese 
historical  populations,  household  composition  and  the  status  of  an 
individual  in  the  family  had  a  considerable  impact  on  the  chance  of 
marrying, time of having children, adoption, and even the likelihood of 
dying of family members (Bengtsson, Campbell and Lee 2004). 
Under  the  traditional  family  systems  and  practice  of  this  kind, 
marriage  and  childbearing  tended  to  be  affected  by  the  ‘collective’ 
decision rather than ‘individual’ choice. In historical northwest Europe, 
marriage  and  reproduction  were  largely  an  issue  concerning  only  the 
couple themselves. To prepare for marriage, the couple involved needed 
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to  accumulate  required  financial  resources,  which  was  particularly 
difficult when the economy was in down turn. This was a main reason for 
late marriage in these countries and for the close relationship between 
changes in real wage and age at first marriage. Under the family system 
like  that  in  historical  China,  the  consideration  of  marriage  and 
reproductive  strategies  was  different.  Continuing  the  family  line, 
especially  that  descending  through  the  eldest  son,  was  of  overriding 
importance.  Marriage,  reproduction,  and  adoption  were  all  important 
means of achieving this goal. To ensure this, marriage and reproduction 
of eldest sons were often given priority over those of their sisters and 
younger  brothers.  Sometimes,  the  interest  of  the  letter  was  even 
sacrificed for this. 
These practices have a number of implications. In countries like 
China it is easier for the government and social elite to assume the role of 
moral authorities and play a stronger part in guiding or influencing the 
social behavior  and practice. This can also be  accomplished with less 
opposition  through the hierarchical political  establishment and kinship 
organizations, such as the lineage and large extended family. This long 
tradition helps to legitimize or consolidate the government’s leading role 
in family planning. While  it  is very difficult for  westerners  to  accept 
government  intervention  into t h e i r  p r i v a t e  l i f e ,  f o r  t h e  C h i n e s e ,  a s  
suggested by Lee and Wang, ‘the current family planning program’ is to 
some extent, ‘merely an extension of familial mode of reproduction to 
the  local  community  or  beyond’  (Lee  and  Wang  1999:  99).  This 
difference once more demonstrates the importance of social institutions 
in influencing people’s productive behavior and fertility changes. 
 
 
Traditional Culture, Reproductive Behaviour  
and Rapid Fertility Decline  
 
In the study of social history, Chinese culture, just like China’s historical 
family system, is also widely seen as favourable to high fertility or very 
pro-natalist. It has been claimed that ‘the fecundity of the Chinese was 
without parallel’ and their ‘birth rate was abnormally high’ (Mallory 1926: 
17 and 87). This was so, because Chinese people wanted to have ‘as many 
children as possible, preferably sons’ (Chandrasekhar 1967: 59) and they 
‘made every effort to maximize the number’ of their sons (Wolf  2001: 134). 
Yet, fertility in China and also in some East Asian populations, which 
have  been  greatly  affected  by  Chinese  culture  but  without  a  strong 
government-led family planning program, has not only fallen very fast, 
but also reached a very low level. This paradoxical situation makes a 
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brief comment on some aspects of China’s reproductive culture necessary 
and useful. 
China’s traditional culture was not as simple and pro-natalist as 
often  assumed  by  some  scholars.  Although  pro-natalist  ideas  were 
promoted and very likely to have dominated in many places, views about 
restricting the number of children and practice of controlling family size 
also existed in the past. As early as Sui and Tang periods (581-907 AD), 
Wang Fanzhi had already expressed the view that having one capable son 
was  enough  and  this  would  free  people  from  vexations  and  tensions 
associated  with  family  division.  He  further  suggested  that  having  no 
children should not be regarded as a problem, as this could free parents 
from worrying about the compulsory military service and other types of 
levy and corvee that would be imposed on their children
10 In the next 
few  dynasties,  scholarly  discussion  of  population  issues  gradually 
increased,  and  this  is  particularly  noticeable  during  the  Ming–Qing 
period  (1368–1911  AD)  when  China’s  population  growth  became 
increasingly  perceptible.  A  number  of  scholars  commented  on  issues 
related  to  China’s  rapid  population  growth,  population  doubling  time, 
replacement  level  of  fertility,  the  relationship  between  the  growth  of 
population and that of the means of subsistence, and how the population 
growth may be controlled. One of them, Hong Liang Ji (1746–1809 AD), 
even earned himself a title of ‘Chinese Malthus’ for the reason that he 
developed some theories which were not only similar to but also a few 
years earlier than those proposed by Malthus.
11  
In  addition  to  the scholarly discussion on  issues about  controlling 
population  growth,  recent  investigations  in  historical  demography  have 
shown that in most historical Chinese populations total marital fertility rates 
were relatively low and usually between 5.5 and 7.0. They could only be 
seen  as  moderate  in  comparison  with  the  so-called  natural  fertility  and 
marital  fertility  rates  recorded  in  some  historical  European  populations. 
While  Chinese  women historically  married y o u ng a n d a n ov e rw helmi n g 
majority of them would marry, the interval between their marriage and first 
birth was comparatively long and about 3 years. Their inter-birth intervals 
were also longer than those recorded in many historical European countries. 
Furthermore, the mean age at last birth was relatively low among Chinese 
women  and  around  38  years.  All  these  are  attributable  to  the  moderate 
marital fertility recorded in the past.  
One  of  the  debating  issues  in  the  study  of  China’s  past  fertility 
behaviour is whether the observed moderate or low marital fertility was due 
to people’s intentional control of family size or merely a result of certain 
social practices and behaviour. Recent investigations have shown that the 
claim that whatever the reasons for China’s past moderate marital fertility, 
‘it was not deliberate fertility control’ is wrong (Wolf 1985: 177). There is 
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evidence suggesting that people had the intention to control their family size 
even in the past.  
For example, infanticides were widely observed in the Song Dynasty 
(960-1279 AD). Scholars and government officials of the time not only 
recorded  the  practice  that  people  killed  their  children  if  the  number 
exceeded  their  expectation,  regardless  of  their  sex;  they  also  noted  or 
commented on people’s motivation of doing so and their desired family size. 
According  to  Su Shi (1037–1101 AD),  in parts of Hubei and Hunan, 
‘peasants usually wanted to have two sons and one daughter. If more 
were born, they would be killed.’ Yang Shi (1053–1135 AD) noted that 
in  parts  of  Fujian  ‘people  had  children  according  to  their  economic 
ability. Even the gentry behaved accordingly ... rich families had no more 
than two sons and one daughter. Middle and lower families generally had 
only one son.’ Also in Fujian, Li Gang (1083–1140 AD) observed that 
‘people kept only one or two children or sons, and the rest would be 
killed  by  drowning’  A  similar  practice  was  found  in  Jiangxi,  where 
according to Zhu Song (1097–1143 AD), ‘people wanted to have only 
two sons, they drowned all the rest thereafter regardless of their sex’ All 
these records indicate a phenomenon that many people did not want to 
maximize their family size or the number of their sons. That this practice 
was recorded by these extremely well-known historical figures provides a 
clear indication that at least as early as in the Song period, intentional 
control of family size existed. There were people who wanted ‘Ji Chan 
Yu Zi’ or ‘Ji Chan Shou Kou’, which literately means ‘having children 
according to their ability and wealth’. In other words, their decisions to 
control  family  size  or  reproduction  stemmed  directly  from  the 
consideration of their short or long term economic interests.
12 
The  above  evidence  shows  an  important  fact  that  intentional 
control of family size is neither an outcome of the China’s nationwide 
family planning program (though strongly promoted by it) nor a result of 
modernization. It existed a long time ago. If the Chinese could have done 
so when they felt that controlling the family size was necessary for their 
families in  the past when  they were  subjected  to  the  influence of the 
traditional culture,  it would be nature or not  too difficult for them  to 
response positively to the call for controlling fertility when they were 
persuaded or realized t h at  it  w o u l d b e  g o o d  f o r  t h e c o u n tr y  a n d  t h ei r 
families in the 20th century. This at least partly explains the early success 
of China’s family planning program, the rapid fertility reduction in the 
1970s and the further fertility decline ever since. 
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Concluding 5emarks 
 
One of the major purposes of this study is to examine China’s recent 
fertility  changes.  Available  evidence  has  shown  that  fertility  patterns 
recorded  by  recent  censuses,  one-percent  population  sample  surveys, 
national  fertility  surveys  and  annual  population  change  surveys  are 
largely  consistent.  According  to  most  of  these  censuses  and  surveys, 
China’s  TFR  had  fallen  below  replacement  in  1991.  Since  then,  it 
declined further to a lower level. China has become a country with far 
below replacement fertility. 
China’s  recent  censuses,  population  sample  surveys,  fertility 
surveys  and  population  change  surveys  were  affected  by  under-
registration problems.  Recorded (or unadjusted) fertility therefore was 
very likely to have been lower than the actual fertility level. However, 
under-registration rates found by available post-enumeration surveys and 
a number of studies that evaluated the quality of recent fertility data are 
lower  than  those  indicated  by  government-adjusted  fertility  statistics. 
Evidence that could sufficiently justify the government-endorsed fertility 
level is not available. 
While it would be useful, the focus of this study is not to estimate 
China’s recent fertility, but rather to show that most of the evidence has 
suggested that China’s recent fertility has been lower than those adjusted 
and published by Chinese authorities. Even after under-registration of a 
reasonable magnitude has been taken into consideration, China’s recent 
fertility is still much lower than the level of replacement. 
It  is  important  to  note  that  while  the  government-led  family 
planning has played an important part in China’s fertility transition, at its 
early  stage  in  particular,  China’s  rapid  fertility  reduction  is  also 
contributable  to some other factors.  The  impact of  China’s traditional 
culture, social institution and reproductive behaviour is not as simple as 
often being assumed. Evidence shows that intentional control of family 
size existed in the past. Chinese traditional culture enclosed elements that 
were not particular pro-natalist. Population pressure and the necessity of 
balancing the growth of population and subsistence were discussed by 
Chinese scholars and government officials. Certain social practice and 
institutions tended to surrender the right of individuals including their 
right to marry or have children to their extended family. All these, in one 
way or another, may have played a non-negative part in China’s recent 
fertility reduction. 
While  it  has  discussed  some  factors  that  have  contributed  to 
China’s  rapid  fertility  transition,  this  paper  was  not  designed  to 
investigate  the  question  why  China’s  fertility  has  fallen  to  far  below 
replacement. Systematically explaining the causes of very low fertility 
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that is confronting many populations in the world is an important and 
challenging task. It is beyond the scope of this study and needs to be 
addressed by another paper.  
 
 
Acknowledgement 
 
The  authors  would  like  to  thank  Pfizer  which  has  provided  partial 
support  to  this  study  through  the  University  of  Cambridge.  
Responsibility for any errors rests with the authors. 
 
 
End Notes 
 
1.  For 1991, 1992 and 1993 annual population change survey results 
are  not  available.  For  1995,  2000  and  2005,  the  statistics  are 
obtained  from  national  population  censuses  or  one-percent 
population sample surveys. 
 
2.  Here, we assume that all births take place among married women. 
This is still true for the majority of Chinese population, which is 
reflected in published fertility statistics including those obtained 
from these surveys. Therefore, adding unmarried women does not 
affect the number of births. We can use the number of married 
women in each age group recorded by the 2006 fertility survey to 
divide the ratio of married women to single women in the same 
age group as recorded by the 2005 one-percent population sample 
survey.  This  will  make  the  proportion  of  married  in  each  age 
group the same between the two populations. 
 
3.  More data will  make average TFRn a n d  a v e r a ge  M AC n for the 
period  more  reliable,  but  they  will  not  alter  the  magnitude  of 
change in  MACn (measured by t h e rn) because  this  is obtained 
from only the MACn of start year and end year. 
 
4.  Guo found that postponing births during 1990 to 1995 made the 
TFR lower than TFR’ by 0.109 on average, but in the period of 
1996  to  1999  the  tempo-effect  increased  to  0.232,  and  the 
composition by parity were 36.9% for the first birth, 56.6% for  
the second birth, and merely 6.5% for the third and above births. 
Therefore, Guo suggested that under this circumstance, focus on 
only mean age at first marriage or mean age at the first birth may 
not be enough in examining the tempo-effect.  
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5.  In estimating the under-registration rate for the 2000 census, we 
simply  assumed  that  the  2005  one-percent  population  sample 
survey  did  not  have  under-registration,  and  that  proportions  of 
population sampled in all age groups are the same and they all 
equal to the reported sample size, which is 1.325 percent of the 
national population. That these assumptions may not always hold 
could affect the estimated under-registration rate. 
 
6.  The CBRs listed in column 3 in Table 6 are computed using the 
number of births recorded in  the 12 months before  the  time of 
enumeration and the total population recorded at the time when 
the survey was undertaken rather than the number of births in the 
specified  year  and  its  mid-year  population.  Since  the  annual 
population change survey was conducted at the end of September 
or October, strictly speaking, the computed rate is not the same as 
conventional CBR, although the two should be very close. In this 
study, the figures shown in column 3 are used to approximate the 
CBRs in specified years. 
 
7.  For 1995, the CBR in column 3 was computed from the 1995 1% 
mini-census sample data. For 2000, the CBR was computed from 
the 2000 census 9.5% sample data. 
 
8.  These  figures  are  very  close  to  those  acknowledged b y  t h e  
statistical authority after the 1995 one-percent population sample 
survey.  They  suspected  that  this  survey,  like  the  1992  fertility 
survey, might have seriously undercounted the number of births. 
On the basis of this consideration and their data evaluation, they 
upwardly adjusted recorded fertility rates: from 14.42 to 17.12 per 
thousand for the CBR and from 1.46 to 1.85 for the TFR (Zhang, 
Yu and Cui 1997: 46). This implies an under-registration of 15.8 
per cent for the CBR and 21.1 per cent for the TFR. Later, the 
TFR has been further adjusted to 1.78. 
 
9.  According to an available explanation, the NBS decided to inflate 
its annual survey results in such a manner partly because of its 
past experience of underestimation. In addition to that, the practice 
was also a response to the strong suspicions of both policymakers 
and  demographers  who  believed  that  the  underreporting  was 
greater  than  they  had  found  (Zhang 1 9 9 5;  Yu  and  Xie  2000). 
Qiao’s speculation may be seen as another possible reason, which 
suggests that the NBS might have used the upper bound of the 
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estimated  reporting  error  interval  as  the  underreporting  rate t o  
make the adjustment (Qiao 2005; also see Jia and Sai 1995). 
 
10.  The scholar who made these comments in his poems was Wang 
Fanzhi, who lived in the Sui (581–618 AD) and early Tang (618–
907 AD) period. For more details see The Transcription of Wang 
Fanzhi’s Poems, by Zhang (1983). 
 
11.  For a detailed discussion on these ideas and suggestions, see Zhao 
(2006). 
 
12.  For a detailed discussion and these citations and their sources, see 
Zhao (2006) and the listed references. 
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